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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of a number of episodes of mass
casualty events, we must be reminded of how important
it is to be prepared and to reﬂect on the knowledge
accumulated over the past 15 years of war in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2016, a group of surgeons gathered at
the headquarters of the American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons in Chicago to discuss disaster
preparedness. The meeting included representatives
from the Orthopedic Academy, the Orthopedic
Trauma Association, the American College of
Surgeons (ACS), the American Association for the
Surgery of Trauma, and the US Military. The
agenda focused on areas where our efforts in plan-
ning and responding to disasters (both man-made
and natural) could be enhanced by working collab-
oratively. The group left after identifying some con-
crete next steps for future meetings. Three days
later, a gunman entered a nightclub in Orlando
with military-grade weapons, leaving 49 dead and
53 wounded. In the wake of this tragedy, the
AAST’s statement on ﬁrearm injuries published
today in the Journal of Trauma and Acute Care
Surgery is eerily timely.1 Similarly, the American
Medical Association’s House of Delegates at its
annual meeting this week passed a resolution to
end the ban on gun violence research, recognizing
that gun violence is a public health issue.2
However, while these are promising developments,
trauma surgeons today must continue to care for
the victims of these mass casualties. We need to be
mindful of how important it is to be prepared and
to reﬂect on the knowledge accumulated over the
past 15 years from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
and from the multiple recent events requiring
responses from our trauma centers in the USA.
Combat casualty care
There are numerous lessons from combat casualty
care that have implications for mass casualty events
in the civilian sector. In 2009, Propper et al3 out-
lined the resources needed to respond to an explo-
sive event, based on their experience in a combat
support hospital in Iraq. Of the 50 patients treated
by these military surgeons after the event, 48%
required a blood transfusion (on average 3.5 units
of packed red blood cells and 3.8 units of plasma/
patient), 76% underwent immediate operation with
a total of 191 total operative procedures (3.8 pro-
cedures/casualty), and 50% required intensive care
unit admission. These quantitative data provide
some guidance for civilian centers that must remain
prepared for similar events. The balanced transfu-
sion protocol ﬁrst outlined by Borgman et al4 (now
part of the so-called Damage Control
Resuscitation) proved to have a mortality advan-
tage, as well as conserved blood products, a pre-
cious resource in any mass casualty. Indeed, such
goal-directed hemostatic resuscitation, guided by
thromboelastography (TEG), has recently been
demonstrated to improve survival while preserving
blood products in a civilian trauma center.5
Eastridge et al6 reviewed deaths on the battleﬁeld
that occurred between 2001 and 2011 and judged
over 24% to be potentially preventable, primarily
as the result of failure to provide hemorrhage
control. Just as Kragh et al7 had shown that use of
the Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT) had a
survival beneﬁt in major limb trauma, Kotwal et al8
essentially eliminated preventable deaths on the
battleﬁeld largely through extensive Tactical
Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) training in the 75th
Ranger Regiment, US Army Special Operations
Command. TCCC includes rapid control of hemor-
rhage, relief of tension pneumothorax, and relief of
airway obstruction, although the majority of inter-
ventions were aimed at hemorrhage control.
Undoubtedly, as we continue to identify gaps in
knowledge in the care of multiple casualties from
the military experience, we will deﬁne additional
areas where research during the interwar period
can help guide treatment in the future.9 There are
still multiple pressing problems that require solu-
tions, including the prehospital control of intracavi-
tary bleeding or the amelioration of the immediate
effects of head injury.
Contemporary civilian experience
Unfortunately, the events occurring with increasing
frequency in our unsettled world have provided
opportunities for civilian surgeons to gain experi-
ence with mass casualties resulting from bomb
explosions and active shooter events. In 2009, a
perpetrator opened ﬁre at the Soldier Readiness
Center at Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas. Within
10 min, 11 people were dead and 32 victims were
injured.10 In reviewing their experience during that
mass casualty event, Wild and others from the
nearby level 1 trauma center noted that errors in
communication in the ﬁeld resulted in several
patients who were miss-triaged. The authors advo-
cated the use of the Simple Triage and Rapid
Transport (START) model for initial ﬁeld triage.11
They also noted the value of a dual command
structure once patients reached the hospital (1
physician in the emergency department and
another directing the ﬂow in the operating room).
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Near the ﬁnish line of the 117th running of the Boston
Marathon in 2013, two improvised explosive devices were deto-
nated by a pair of terrorists. A total of 281 people were injured
and 127 patients received care at participating trauma centers.
The collaborative response among the seven Boston trauma
centers was unprecedented and is undoubtedly responsible for
the 0% mortality among those who reached the hospital (3
spectators died immediately at the scene). A total of 75 patients
were admitted to a hospital and 54 required operative interven-
tion within the ﬁrst 48 hours.12 The majority of injuries were to
the lower extremities, including vascular, bony, and soft tissue
trauma. Despite the clearly overwhelming success of the Boston
Collaborative, there were still areas identiﬁed for improve-
ments.13 Communication difﬁculties were reported at all sites, a
problem that seems universal during all civilian disasters.
Maldistribution of patients and lack of triage tags on casualty
victims were also cited by the Boston Trauma Center Chiefs’
Collaborative.14 While we all were impressed with the willing-
ness of ﬁrst responders and spectators alike to administer ﬁrst
aid, several makeshift ﬁeld tourniquets such as belts and other
articles of clothing were not properly applied and as such did
not control bleeding. Most importantly, the trauma surgeons in
Boston advocated continued preparation for the next disaster
and resisting complacency based on a single experience with a
successful outcome.
Although survivors of plane crashes are exceedingly rare, our
experience with the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 on
landing in San Francisco allowed us to gain experience with the
largest multiple casualty event in the history of San Francisco
General Hospital and Trauma Center.14 Among the 307 people
aboard that ﬂight, 192 were injured, and 63 were initially trans-
ported to our hospital with 10 in critical condition. Despite the
high impact of the crash, only two patients died at the scene
and only one in the hospital. The most severe injuries sustained
from this blunt trauma included spine fractures, traumatic brain
injury, and intestinal injuries. In the ﬁrst 48 hours, 15 operations
were performed and 117 total units of blood products were
transfused. Different from other disasters, we used CT scanning
liberally in order to completely evaluate a large number of
patients with the potential for multiple injuries. Providing surgi-
cal leadership in the emergency department and the operating
room (dual command) was also thought to be important. We
documented that 370 nursing overtime hours were required to
care for the injured on the day of the event. It is also important
to note that this type of disaster lasts for several weeks and
requires prolonged engagement of the entire surgical team.
Empowering the public to enhance survivability from
intentional mass casualty and active shooter events
Beginning in 2013, shortly after the Sandy Hook shootings, a
group of concerned representatives from public safety organiza-
tions including law enforcement, ﬁre ﬁghters, prehospital provi-
ders, trauma physicians, and the military participated in a series
of meetings in Hartford, Connecticut, facilitated by Jacobs
et al.15 The Harford Consensus is focused on providing the
public with the education and materials that are needed to
prevent death from hemorrhage. The public responders have
been termed ‘ﬁrst care providers’ or immediate responders, to
separate them from the ‘ﬁrst responders’ such as emergency
medical services and ﬁre ﬁghters.16 In October 2015, the White
House National Security Council staff and its Ofﬁce of Medical
Preparedness Policy launched the national ‘Stop the Bleed’
campaign (https://www.dhs.gov/stopthebleed). This program is
intended to teach citizens how to save lives from major trauma
based on the principles of TCCC described above.17 Combining
these two parallel initiatives, Hartford Consensus IV, meeting in
Dallas in January 2016, assembled a large group of stakeholders
including participants from the Military, the Committee on
Trauma (COT) and the ACS, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Law Enforcement, the National Association of
Emergency Medical Technicians and the Department of
Homeland Security. The focus of Hartford Consensus IV was to
promote education of police and ﬁre in hemorrhage control
using military tourniquets and combat gauze and to begin a
national campaign to educate the public, promoting the avail-
ability of bleeding control kits in places such as schools, malls,
theaters, sporting arenas, etc.18 A recently completed national
survey has conﬁrmed that the overwhelming majority of respon-
dents would be both physically able and willing to provide ﬁrst
aid including hemorrhage control to a victim of a shooting or a
car crash.19 Interestingly, some of the survivors of the Orlando
disaster stated that they tried to administer care as best they
could to those who were injured during the prolonged wait to
be rescued from the hostage situation (informal interviews on
CNN).
Summary
As tragic as all these mass casualty events truly are, we must not
lose sight of the need to thoroughly examine each one for
lessons learned (and relearned) in order to continuously prepare
for the next one. Partnering with our military colleagues in the
new Military Trauma Care’s Learning Health System will assure
exchange of information and forge ahead a research program
designed to improve the care of all who are involved in disasters
and mass casualty events. Great lessons have already been
learned but more are still to be taught. Adequate trauma
research funding by governmental agencies, the military sector,
and private industry should become a priority at a time when
trauma has claimed so many lives and is unfortunately destined
to claim more. Educating, equipping, and then empowering the
public could save additional lives similar to the introduction of
bystander cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Failure to take action
at this time in our history would be the biggest tragedy of all.
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